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INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT. By Anthony 
D'Amato. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Transnational Publishers. 1987. 
Pp. vi, 250. $45.50. 
Two of the most important issues of contemporary international 
law are the transboundary use of military force and the protection of 
individual human rights. In International Law: Process and Prospect, 
Professor Anthony D' Amato1 develops an entitlement-based theory of 
the underlying foundation of international law through an examina-
tion of these issues, both in the abstract and in light of recent events.2 
His argument - that international law is enforced through reciprocal 
entitlement violations - provides a useful explanatory mechanism for 
the well known observation that "[a]lmost all nations observe almost 
all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations 
almost all of the time."3 
To develop his reciprocal entitlements theory, D' Amato initially 
addresses the question of whether international law is really "law," 
given that, unlike a typical domestic legal system, there is no central 
enforcement authority, no court system of compulsory jurisdiction, 
and no legislature. He argues that despite these differences, interna-
tional law does exist, and that it is enforceable in a manner very simi-
lar to domestic legal enforcement mechanisms. 
He advances this argument by identifying characteristics of en-
forcement common to all legal systems and then analyzing their opera-
tion in international law. In any legal system, enforcement consists of 
some legally imposed sanction. These sanctions may be physical, such 
as imprisonment, or may be nonphysical, such as imposition of a mon-
etary fine. Either of these sanctions, however, can be characterized as 
a deprivation of a right or entitlement. Such methods of enforcement 
are premised on the notion that individuals are assigned some entitle-
ments in the first place- as D'Amato notes, "[t]here is no 'law' in the 
'jungle' " (p. 15). He states that in all legal systems, without excep-
tion, there is legal recognition of certain rights of the people, making 
each person vulnerable to removal of some of those rights by the law. 
He asserts that "[l]egal systems typically enforce their own rules by 
1. Anthony D'Amato is a Professor of Law at Northwestern University, and serves on the 
Board of Editors of the American Journal of International Law. He is president of the Interna-
tional Law Section of the American Association of Law Schools, and he founded the Human 
Rights Advocacy Group of the American Society of International Law. 
2. In a postscript, D'Amato also discusses the difficulties facing a young attorney who wishes 
to pursue a career in public international law, and gives practical suggestions on how these diffi-
culties can be met. Pp. 233-45. 
3. L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted). 
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removing one or more entitlements of persons who violate the rules" 
(p. 15). 
D' Amato argues that international law is enforced in a similar 
manner. He suggests that "[a]s a construct of international law, a na-
tion is nothing more nor less than a bundle of entitlements ... " (p. 
19). Every state possesses the same entitlements, although the interest 
states have in a particular entitlement may vary.4 In response to skep-
tics of international law who contend that it is not really "law" (since 
there is no effective enforcement mechanism), D' Amato argues that 
these entitlements are protected through a system of reciprocal entitle-
ment violations. 5 If state A violates an entitlement of state B, state B 
is justified under international law in violating an entitlement of state 
A. The reciprocal violation may be of the same entitlement or a differ-
ent one. 
To illustrate how the system operates, D' Amato offers the hypo-
thetical situation of a primitive international system involving two 
states who are at war, but desire peace. Assuming there are no pre-
scribed methods of establishing peace, state A may decide to dispatch a 
courier to state B, carrying a letter requesting safe passage and expres-
sing state A's desire for peace. If state B kills the courier, the war will 
continue. However, if the courier is not harmed, the beginning of a 
limited ambassadorial immunity is established. D' Amato posits that a 
single entitlement such as this is precarious, because the only remedy 
for violation of the entitlement by a state is that of reciprocal violation 
by the other state of the same entitlement. This tit-for-tat strategy can 
have the effect of eroding, rather than preserving the entitlement. 6 
Although D' Amato does not discuss how particular entitlements 
arise, he does argue that an increased number of entitlements is more 
stable in two ways. First, a state will be hesitant to violate an entitle-
ment of another state because it will not be able to predict which of its 
own entitlements will be violated in response (p. 16). Second, this tit-
for-a-different-tat strategy will not have the effect of eroding the origi-
nal entitlement. For example, in response to the seizure of the United 
States Embassy in Tehran, the United States froze Iranian assets 
rather than retaliating by jailing Iranian consular and diplomatic offi-
cials. The United States' action was tolerated by general silence. 
4. For example, every state has an entitlement to jurisdiction over its territorial waters. A 
country such as Switzerland, which lacks territorial waters and has no near-term prospects of 
obtaining any, may be assumed to have a near-zero interest in this particular entitlement. 
S. D'Amato also discusses two different arguments that international law is "law," neither of 
which he finds conclusive. The "enforcement" argument suggests that physical enforcement is 
not the hallmark of law, and that therefore the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism does 
not mean that international law does not exist. The "verbal" argument contends that the use of 
legal language in intergovernmental communications supports the proposition that governments 
resort to "law" in their attempts to influence each other. Pp. 1-13. 
6. In the case of the two states in the example above, it would simply eliminate the ambassa-
dorial immunity entitlement and plunge them back into war. Seep. 16. 
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D' Amato infers from the silence that "the community of nations ... 
did not perceive a threat to the shared entitlement of keeping state-
owned deposits in foreign banks as a result of the American action, but 
rather regarded the U.S. action as a temporary infringement of an Ira-
nian entitlement for the limited purpose of enforcing the original enti-
tlement of diplomatic immunity."7 
D' Amato then moves on to examine the substantive issue of the 
transboundary use of force against the background of the reciprocal 
entitlement violation enforcement mechanism he has developed. He 
contends that the use of force is legal under international law only if it 
is an enforcement action. 8 To be characterized as a legal enforcement 
action, a use of force must meet certain tests: The appropriate party 
must employ the force, use force proportional to the harm, limit the 
duration of the enforcement action, and refrain from using the force to 
effect a change in the territorial integrity or political independence of 
the country against which the action is taken (pp. 29-30). 
D' Amato reviews the attitudes of international scholars toward the 
legality of the use of force in several different situations, including self-
defense, self-help, defense and help of others, and group action. He 
notes that these attitudes have undergone dramatic change in recent 
decades. Prior to the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, a 
large body of literature supported the concept that the use of force, 
short of war, was legal in appropriate circumstances, and that war 
itself was not inconsistent with international law.9 However, since 
1945 other authorities have asserted that the United Nations Charter 
preempts all principles of international law relating to the use of force, 
and that the propriety of any use of force, including actions in self-
defense, must be tested against the Charter.10 Many scholars, in fact, 
view the primary objective of the Charter as preservation of peace 
rather than promotion of justice (p. 54). But some scholars fear that if 
the Charter is interpreted this way, small states will take advantage of 
7. P. 24. D'Amato acknowledges that relying on reciprocal entitlement violations for the 
enforcement of international law presents a danger of "potential escalation of entitlement viola-
tions, ultimately leading to international anarchy." P. 25. However, he argues that because law 
may become ineffective does not mean that law never existed in the first place. 
8. P. 28. Self-defense, which is recognized by all states as a valid use of force, is itself a type 
of enforcement action, designed to protect against and repel an invader that has invaded illegally. 
9. P. 53. See, e.g., 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 79-142 (A. McNair 4th ed. 
1926). 
10. This view interprets article 51 of the Charter ("Nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against 
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security .... ") as restricting the traditional doctrine of self-
defense to cases involving actual armed attack. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 
140-45 (2d. ed. 1979); I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY 
STATES 275 (1963); Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 
1633-35 (1984) (supporting an interpretation that would also allow anticipatory self-defense in 
limited situations). 
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the legal prohibition against the use of force and take actions that they 
otherwise would not.11 
D' Amato implies, however, that a new attitude toward the use of 
force is developing, similar to the pre-Charter position (p. 55). The 
world community, he argues, increasingly views the Charter's protec-
tion of human rights as no less important than its prohibitions against 
the use of force. He predicts that "the more the veto blocks the Secur-
ity Council from acting in real cases of human-rights deprivations that 
continue to arise, the more international law will begin to bypass the 
United Nations Charter and begin to forge a new set of principles that 
mediate between the use of force and the protection of human rights" 
(p. 55). D' Amato cites the development of nuclear warfare as a reason 
for the change in attitudes toward the use of force. Because the collec-
tive security system envisioned under the Charter was designed for 
situations involving conventional weapons, it is ineffective for situa-
tions involving nuclear weapons, which cause virtually instantaneous 
destruction. The collective security system is therefore no longer able 
to fulfill what D' Amato believes is the purpose of international law: 
"to create the precondition for peace and human rights" (p. 84). In-
stead, the legal rules governing the use of force must be reinterpreted 
in light of current realities. He states, "[T]he destructive potential of 
nuclear weapons is so enormous as to call into question any and all 
received rules of international law regarding the transboundary use of 
force" (p. 86). 
D'Amato examines closely article 2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter, 12 focusing specifically on the phrases "territorial integrity" 
and "political independence." He contends that "the words of Article 
2( 4) acquired their meaning from previous usage in international in-
struments and documents that were accessible to the signatories to the 
Charter of the United Nations" (p. 57). Based on an historical review 
of treaties of guaranty, article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant, 
and other international documents, D' Amato concludes that the no-
tion of "territorial integrity" did not include a concept of inviolability, 
but instead had a meaning generally equivalent to "preventing the per-
manent loss of a portion of one's territory" (p. 59; emphasis omitted). 
However, while he recognizes that an historical approach is only one 
of several valid methods of interpreting article 2( 4) - the others being 
the context of the article and the meaning attributed to it since it be-
came part of the Charter - he deals only with the historical approach 
because he feels it has been the most neglected of the three (p. 58). 
11. See, e.g., J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 22 (1958). 
12. Article 2(4) provides: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 
2, para. 4. 
·May 1988] International Law 1489 
D'Amato argues that uses of force such as the 1981 Israeli raid on 
the Iraqi nuclear reactor are not violations of article 2(4), despite the 
fact that the raid was immediately condemned by the United Nations 
Security Council as violative of international law. 13 He suggests that 
destroying another nation's emerging capability to make or prepare 
nuclear weapons may constitute a new justification for the use of force. 
"Although Israel's strike was certainly a use of force, it arguably was 
not directed at Iraq's territorial integrity or political independence," 
he states (p. 79). He further contends that because there was no evi-
dence of any Israeli purpose beyond destroying the nuclear reactor 
itself, Israel's action was analogous to a limited "humanitarian inter-
vention" (p. 80). D' Amato also suggests that even if the Israeli action 
was not justified on that basis, it ought to be justified if Israel compen-
sated Iraq, analogizing to the American law of eminent domain. He 
states: "International law has not yet evolved to the point of justifying 
forcible actions so long as compensation is paid, but it is clear that 
such a norm would introduce a desirable level of flexibility in interna-
tional law." 14 
A major problem with this suggestion is that D' Amato fails to 
identify the appropriate actor who would make the decision that the 
use of force is justified, and what the criteria for that determination 
would be. D' Amato rejects the proposition that Israel's action could 
be justified as self-defense, noting that "[i]f self-defense is to have any 
meaning in international law, its meaning must have a degree of objec-
tivity and cannot be wholly auto-interpreted" (p. 78). Yet he does not 
offer any reason why the use of force with compensation should be 
different in this regard from self-defense, and he implies that Israel 
was the appropriate actor to decide the nuclear reactor should be de-
stroyed. Moreover, D' Amata's focus on the historical interpretation 
of article 2( 4) and not the other methods of interpretation makes his 
claim that the strike was not prohibited by the article at best 
incomplete. 15 
The second major issue on which D' Amato focuses is international 
human rights. He explores how the law of human rights can be ac-
commodated in an international legal system that addresses itself to 
nations rather than individuals. Traditionally, a state's treatment of a 
13. He notes that although the Security Council verbally condemned the action, no form of 
punishment was requested or mentioned. P. 77. See 36 U.N. SCOR (2288th mtg.) at 10, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/487 (1981), reprinted in 15 AM. J. INTL. L. 724 (1981). 
14. Pp. 83-84. D'Amato concedes that this argument has not been well received. Neither 
Israel nor Iraq supported this position when D'Amato presented it at the Senate hearings on the 
legality of the Israeli raid, and he states that as far as he is aware, "no one else has reacted 
favorably to it either." P. 84. 
15. For example, D'Amato acknowledges that ifa contextual analysis leads to the conclusion 
that the meaning of article 2( 4) is dependent upon the effective use of the enforcement machinery 
under chapter 7 of the Charter, then article 2(4) must be reinterpreted in light of the subsequent 
failure of the superpowers to agree on the employment of the enforcement machinery. P. 58. 
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particular individual was of concern to international law only when 
that individual was a national of the state in question. A state's free-
dom to treat its own nationals in the manner it desired was seen as an 
- element implicit in its sovereignty: its actions were not subject to scru-
tiny under international law. However, international law has long rec-
ognized that mistreatment of an alien is an offense against the state 
whose nationality he bears. Because the violation is viewed as one 
against the state rather than the individual, the right to seek redress 
for the violation also belongs to the state rather than the individual. 16 
Before examining whether international human rights norms cur-
rently exist and, if so, what the content of those norms is, D' Amato 
explores the more fundamental question of whether, given the classical 
conception of international law as created by and applied to states, it is 
possible for individuals to have direct claims under international law, 
including direct claims against their own states. Although D' Amato 
does not believe that international law has progressed far enough to 
recognize direct claims of individuals, he argues that it can be used to 
protect human rights because human rights norms fit into the general 
concept of legal entitlements. D' Amato first notes that international 
law has long recognized that every state is entitled to have its nationals 
afforded a minimum level of treatment by other states. He then points 
out that since the distinction between an alien and a national is an 
"entirely juridical construct,"17 nothing would prevent an expansion 
of the notion that a state may ensure that certain minimum human 
rights are afforded its nationals to include a state's entitlement to en-
sure minimum human rights for all individuals. 
Assuming, then, that there is a norm prohibiting certain treatment 
of individuals, what state has an entitlement to enforce another state's 
proper treatment of its own nationals? D' Amato suggests that all 
other states may claim such an entitlement. "The human rights viola-
tor is . . . an enemy of all mankind, and jurisdiction to punish his 
violations is universal" (p. 107). He asserts that these human rights 
norms are enforceable in the way that all norms are enforced: recipro-
cal entitlement violations. 18 
An element lacking in D' Amato's argument is a discussion of how 
the doctrine of proportionality would be applied to human rights vio-
lations. D' Amato acknowledges that the issue of proportionality 
arises in all situations where a tit-for-a-different-tat strategy is em-
ployed, and that "it is difficult to imagine how rules could be formu-
16. See generally L. HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY 89-132 (1978). 
17. P. 107. In a case involving alleged mistreatment of two individuals, A and B, there may 
be nothing that distinguishes the individuals except for the fact that A is an alien and B a na-
tional of the alleged violator. In this situation, A's treatment is a matter of international law, and 
B's is not. Id. 
18. D'Amato acknowledges, however, that the existence of such an entitlement exists does 
not guarantee that any state or group of states will have the interest to pursue it. P. 108. 
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lated that deal specifically and usefully with questions of 
proportionality ... " (pp. 100-01). The problem becomes even more 
complex when the original violation is of a universal entitlement. 
Must the combined response of all states be proportional to the origi-
nal violation, or may each state respond in a way that is proportional 
to the original violation? 
Additionally, under D' Am.ato's reciprocal entitlement violation 
theory the danger exists that the enforcement of human rights may be 
used as a justification for a use of force that is, in truth, motivated by 
much less laudable purposes. For example, D' Amato suggests that 
Iraq's military invasion of Iran in early September of 1980, the pur-
pose of which was certainly not to make Iran respect its human rights 
obligations, was viewed with general indifference because "the interna-
tional community mentally branded Iran an 'outlaw' [for its ratifica-
tion of the imprisonment of the American diplomats] and was willing 
to tolerate a severe violation of one of Iran's basic entitlements in re-
taliation therefor, no matter who inflicted it" (p. 119). Such an indi-
rect method of enforcement of human rights norms creates a grave 
risk that human rights violations will be used as a pretext to justify use 
of force in the furtherance of unrelated goals. Because the entitlement 
belongs to other states rather than the individuals actually harmed, the 
human rights violator will face a reciprocal entitlement violation only 
when other states believe it is in their interest to respond. 
Overall, D' Am.ato's reciprocal entitlement violation theory of the 
enforcement of international law provides an interesting perspective 
from which to analyze international law. It is a useful mechanism to 
explain world reaction, or lack of reaction, to recent international 
events. The principal weakness~ of the system D' Amato constructs 
are its failure to identify the appropriate actors to decide when to im-
pose a reciprocal violation, and its failure to account for the propor-
tionality of nations' reactions. 
- Linda A. Schoemaker 
